Brigham Young University Education and Law Journal
Volume 2009 | Number 1

Article 4

Spring 3-1-2009

Morals Clauses for Educators in Secondary and
Postsecondary Schools: Legal Applications and
Constitutional Concerns
Marka B. Fleming
Amanda Harmon-Cooley
Gwendolyn Mcfadden-Wade

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/elj
Part of the Educational Administration and Supervision Commons, and the Education Law
Commons
Recommended Citation
Marka B. Fleming, Amanda Harmon-Cooley, and Gwendolyn Mcfadden-Wade, Morals Clauses for Educators in Secondary and
Postsecondary Schools: Legal Applications and Constitutional Concerns, 2009 BYU Educ. & L.J. 67 (2009).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/elj/vol2009/iss1/4

.
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Brigham Young University
Education and Law Journal by an authorized editor of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

MORALS CLAUSES FOR EDUCATORS IN SECONDARY
AND POSTSECONDARY SCHOOLS:
LEGAL APPLICATIONS AND CONSTITUTIONAL
CONCERNS
Marka B. Fleming*
Amanda Harmon Cooley**
Gwendolyn McFadden- Wade***
"A teacher affects eternity; he can never tell where his
influence stops."- Henry Adams 1
I. INTRODUCTION

Teachers have an extraordinary opportunity to impact the
lives of their students on both the secondary and postsecondary
level. Because of this unique role, teachers are frequently
required to agree to morals clauses as a condition of
employment. In general, morals clauses in employment
contracts allow an employer to terminate employment when an
employee's conduct is potentially detrimental to the employer's
* Assistant Professor of Business Law, North Carolina A&T State University. J .D.,
North Carolina Central University School of Law, 1996. B.S., Wake Forest University,
1993.
** Assistant Professor of Business Law, North Carolina A&T State Uni versity. J.D.,
The University of North Caro lina at Chapel Hill, 2003. B.A., The Univ ersity of North
Carolina at Chapel Hill, 2000.
***Associate Professor of Accounting, North Carolina A&T State University. LL.M. in
Taxation, University of Florida. J.D. , Stetson University. M.A., University of South
Carolina . B.S., South Carolina State University.
1. HENRY BROOKS ADAMS, THE EDUCATION OF HENRY ADAMS 300 (Modern
Library 2000) (1918). Modern conventions on the use of gender neutral language as
adopted by the major citation systems and writing guides, such as The Bluebook
system of citation and the Publication Manu a l of the American Psychological
Associ ation, apply to the text of this article. How ever, many of the sources cited before
these conventions took hold do not maintain gender neutrali ty. Citing to these sources
is by no means an endorsement of gender-biased la nguage.
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interest. 2 Within the educational sector, morals clauses are
commonly imposed upon teachers through state statutory
provisions requiring that teachers do not engage in "immoral
conduct." 3 Occasionally, morals clauses are imposed upon
teachers through contractual provisions requiring that they
comply with prescribed moral standards. 4
Recent media reports describing teachers engaging in drug
use, sexual misconduct with students, and felonious criminal
behavior would suggest that there is a need to require morally
appropriate behavior from secondary and postsecondary school
educators. 5 Should a teacher be allowed to remain in his or her
position if he or she engages in "immoral conduct"? Many
secondary and postsecondary schools (both public and private)
are answering this question in the negative, and are enforcing
morals clauses against teachers who have demonstrated
allegedly immoral behavior. 6 Moreover, some schools have
taken mandatory morality as a condition of employment a step
further by implementing policies to "deter immorality," such as
guidelines governing the relationship between students and
t eachers 7 and procedures for compulsory drug testing of

2. See Noah B. Kressler, Using the Morals Clause in Talent Agree ments: A
Historical, Legal and Practical Guide, 29 COLUM . J.L. & AHTS 235 (2005).
3. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 14.20.170(a)(2) (2008) (stating that "[a] teache r,
including a teacher who has acquired tenure rights, may be dismissed at any time .
for ... immorality").
4. See, e.g., Howard M. Smulevitz, School Chief Gets [,anger Contract,
I NmANAPOLIS STAR, May 2, 2002, at B3 (describing how it is standard practice for a ll
ed ucationa l contracts in an Indiana school district to contain morals clauses).
5. See, e.g. , Nichole Dobo, Three County Teachers Lose Certification , YORK DAILY
RECORD (York, Pa.), Apr. 6, 2008, at 1 (describing how in 2004, a high school social
studies t eacher resigned from the Dallasto wn Area School District in P e nnsylvania
after being accused of having a sexual relationship with a student and misusing a
district computer and how , in 2006, a reading teacher r esigned from the West Shore
School District in Pennsylvani a after the teacher allegedly attempted to kill her
terminally ill husband, and pled guilty to reckless endan ger ment and drunk driving);
see also Delano R. Massey, Ex-Teacher Pleads to Lesser Sex Counts: Faced Felony
Charges of Abusing 3 Males in 70's, 80's, LEXINGTON HERALD- LEADER, Dec. 15, 2007, a t
Al; ,Joe McDonald, ESU Professor Guilty of Sex Assault Against Student; ls Acquitted
of Rape Charge. Lesser Crime Can Mean 10-Year Term, MORNING CALL (P a.) , Sept. 11,
2007, at B6; Carla Rivera & Jason Song, Schools Try to Ease Fears After Arrests;
Pasadena and Lynwood Campuses Respond When Two Veteran Teachers are Nabb ed in
Internet Child Porn Sting, Los ANGELES Tr.MES, Dec. 2, 2007 at B3; Substitute Teacher
Facing Porn Charge, TULSA WORLD, Dec. 8, 2007, at A5.
6. See, e.g. , ,James Roland, Popular Coach Let Go: A Baby Out of Wedlock
Violates the Morals Clause, SARASOTA H EHALD-TRIBUNE, May 28, 2002. at A 1.
7. See , e.g., UC Regents Approve Ban on Faculty Dating Students, SA N MATEO
DAILY JOURNAL, July 18, 2003, at 1.
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teachers. 8
There are, however, constitutional uncertainties that exist
when morality is a condition of employment. In these
instances, many questions arise, such as: how is immorality
defined; when does it apply; how much of a teacher's life can be
regulated; and when has the school crossed the zone of privacy?
Thus, the inclusion of morality as a condition of maintaining
employment and the emerging policies discouraging immoral
behavior raise significant constitutional concerns regarding
their validity.
This article will examine the influence of educators and
their positions a s role models, the legal applications of
statutory morality provisions for secondary and postsecondary
school teachers, and the implications of contractual morals
clauses for secondary and postsecondary school teachers.
Finally, the paper will analyze the overriding constitutional
implications of imposing these morals clauses upon teachers.

II. THE INFLUENCE OF TEACHERS AND THEIR POSITIONS AS
ROLE MODELS

In 2007, approximately 4.6 million teachers throughout
America taught over 73 million students. 9 These statistics are
important becau se teaching is not just a "rote, mechanical
conveyance of factual information from one mind to another." 10
Rather, teaching is an important profession, in which the
educator may serve as a role model, mentor, friend, and/or
parental figure. 11 Indeed, teachers have an extraordinary
responsibility: they "leave indelible impressions on the minds
of their young students, because they are entrusted with the
safe keeping and education of children during their most
impressionable and formative years." 12 In explaining the
8. S ee, e.g. , Angela Mack, Pender Schools to Drug Test: System Tahes Lead in
Area for ScreeninR All New Employees, STAR· NEWS (Wilmington, N.C.), May 10, 2005,
at lB.
9. S ee U. S. DEPARTMF;NT OF ED UCATiON, NATIONAL CENTER FOR EDUCATION
STATISTI CS, l'RO.H:CT!ONS OF EDUCATION STATISTI CS TO 2016, TABLE 1 (2007), available
at h ttp://nces.ed .gov/programs/digest/d07/
tabl es/dt07_001. asp?referrer=re port (last visited May 3, 2008).
10. Rogliano v. F ayette County Bd. of Educ., 347 S.E.2d 220, 226 (W. Va. 1986)
(Neely, J ., dis sen t ing).
11 . Sec, e.g. , Knox County Educ. Ass'n v. Knox County Bd . of Educ., 158 F.3d 36 1,
384 (6th Cir. 1998).
12.

ld.
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essential role of teachers, the United States Supreme Court
has stated:
A teacher works in a sensitive area in a schoolroom. There he
shapes the attitude of young minds towards the society in
which they live. In this, the state has a vital concern . It must
preserve the integrity of the schools. That the school
authorities have the right and the duty to screen the officials,
teachers, and employees as to their fitness to maintain the
integrity of the schools as a part of ordered society, cannot be
doubted. 13
As such, through the presentation of course material,
teachers have a unique opportunity to influence students. 14
Further, the mere presence of the teacher in the classroom
sends a message to students in that the teacher "exert[s] a
subtle but important influence over [the students'] perceptions
and values." 15 Students, in part, acquire their social attitudes
and other important behaviors by emulating their teachers'
attitudes and by absorbing the substantive lessons of their
teachers. 16 Thus, given their influence on students, "[teachers]
are intended by parents, citizenry, and lawmakers alike to
serve as good examples for their young charges." 17
This expectation for educators is by no means a new
proposition; historically, courts have noted that "it has always
been the recognized duty of the teacher to conduct himself in
such a way as to command the respect and good will of the
community." 18 In fact, "[w]hen public schools were established
13. Adler v. Bd. of Educ. of City of N.Y., 342 U.S. 485, 493 (1952) (reasoning that
the Board of Education, as a municipal employer, was not precluded from inquiring of
its employees as t o m atters that could prove relevant to their fitnes s and suitability for
public service).
14. See Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 78-79 (1979) (stating that "through both
the presentation of course materials and the example he sets, a teach er has a n
opportunity to influence the attitudes of students toward government, the political
process, and a citizen's social responsibilities").
15. Id.; see also Bd. of Educ. of Cape Girardeau Sch. Dist. No. 6:3. v. Thomas , 926
S.W.2d 1()3, 164-66 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996) (upholding the termination of a high school
teacher for immoral conduct after she a llegedly shot her estra nged husband, which was
based in part on a finding t hat the teacher's "actions contradicted the message sent by
the school district, presenting a 'do as I say, not as I do' dilemma for her students").
16. See Ambach, 441 U.S. at 79; see also Skoros v. City of N.Y. , 437 F. 3d l , 19 (2d
Cir. 2006) (stating that New York City schools "play a particularly importa nt r ole in
teaching these essentia l elements of pluralism to future generations of Americans").
17. Faulkner v. New Bern-Craven County Bd. of Educ. , 316 S. E.2d 281 , 291 (N.C .
1984); see also Barringer v. Caldwell County Bd. of Educ., 4 7::l S. E.2d 435, 440-41 (N.C.
Ct. App. 1996).
18. Horosko v. Sch. Dist. of Mount Pleasant Twp. , 6 A.2d 866,868 (Pa. 19:39).
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in the United States in the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries, one of their stated missions was to teach moral
virtues." 19 In the early history of American education, teachers
"were expected to teach and discipline their students to be
respectful of authority and responsible in completing their
lessons." 20 By the early twentieth century, ardent calls for
moral development and character education within the public
schools came from a broad spectrum of educational
philosophers, ranging from John Dewey to William Hutchins. 21
As the twentieth century progressed, these calls were
heeded by state legislatures, which passed both character
education statutes and educator employment statutes that
required morality among teachers. 22 The continued
implementation of such legislation demonstrates that the
historical, public expectations that teachers be morally upright
individuals remain fundamentally the same today. Essentially,
"[b]ecause of teachers' influential role[s] in the lives of young
people, the public still expects teachers to display behaviors
reflective of moral virtues, such as fairness and honesty, and to
adhere to professional codes of conduct." 23
Ill. STATUTORY MORALS CLAUSES FOR SECONDARY AND
POSTSECONDARY EDUCATORS

For secondary and postsecondary school educators
employed by public institutions, morals clauses are generally
imposed through state statutes prohibiting the teachers from
engaging in conduct that is criminal, immoral, or
unbecoming.24 While courts may consider the educational level
19. Angela Lumpkin, Teachers as Role Models Teaching Character and Moral
Virtu es , J . PHYSICAL EDUC., RECREi\'l'ION & DANCE, Feb. 2008, a t 45 (citing SCHOOL:
THE STORY OF AMERICAN PUBLIC EDUCATION (Sarah Mondale & Sarah B. Patton eds.,
2001): Young .Jay Mulkey, The History of Character Education, J. PHYSICAL Enuc .,
RE CHEATION & DANCE, Nov./Dec. 1997, at a5, a5-a7); see also Perry L. Glanzer &
Andrew ,J. Milson, Legislating the Good: A Survey and Evaluation of Character
Education Laws in the United States, 20 EDUC. POT:V 525, 527-29 (2006).
20. Lumpkin, supra note 19, at 45.
21. See, e.g., Mulkey, supra note 19, at 35- 37.
22. See, e.g., 70 OKLA. STAT. § 6-101.22(A)(7) (2008) (stating that "[s]ubject to the
provi sio ns of the Teacher Due Process Act of 1990, a career teach er may be dismissed
or not reemployed for ... commission of an act of moral turpitude"); see also Glanzer &
Milson , supra note 19, at 529-42.
28. Lumpkin, supra note 19, a t 45.
24. See generally John D. Copeland & John W. Murry, Jr., Getting Tossed from
the ivory Tower: The Legal implications of Evaluating Faculty Performance, 61 Mo. L.
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(secondary or postsecondary) involved in determining whether
grounds for discipline or dismissal exist, both secondary and
postsecondary teachers have been disciplined or terminated
pursuant to the enforcement of state morality statutes for
behavior that includes sexual misconduct, corruption, drug use,
abusive language, lying, criminal activity, and felony
convictions. 25

A. Statutory Provisions Governing Morality for Secondary
School Teachers
In many states, if a secondary school teacher engages in
immoral behavior, this behavior constitutes grounds for
disciplining the teacher. 26 The discipline can result in severe
penalties, including suspension or revocation of the teaching
certificate. 27 Pursuant to certain state statutory schemes,
immoral behavior also can constitute sufficient cause for
terminating or suspending tenured teachers or teachers under
a definite term contract. 28
Despite the panoply of state statutes that allow for the
discipline and dismissal of secondary school educators based on
immoral behavior, relatively few jurisdictions have statutes

REV. 233, 259-60 (1996); Jason R. Fulmer, Dismissing the "Immoral" Teacher for

Conduct Outside the

Workplace~Do

Current Laws Protect the Interest of Both School

Authorities and Teachers?, 31 J.L. & EDUC. 271, 272-73 (2002).
25. See Fulmer, supra note 24, at 271; Robert W. McGee, Academic Tenure:
Should It Be Protected By Law?, 20 W. ST. U. L. REV. 593, 596 (1993).
26. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 14.20.030(a)(2) (2008); CAL. EDUC. CODE § 44421
(2007); FLA. STAT. § 1012. 795(1)(c) (2008); 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/21-23(a) (2008); IND.
CODE ANN. § 20-28-5-7(1) (2008); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-1:~83 (2006); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS§ 13-42-9 (2008); WASH. REV. CODE§ 28A.410.090(1) (2008); W.VA. CODE§ 18A-36 (2007); WYO. STAT. ANN.§ 21-2-802(c) (2007).
27. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 14.20.030 (a)(2) (providing that "[t]he commissioner
or the Professional Teaching Practices Commission may revoke or suspend a certificate
[for] ... immorality, which is defined as the commission of an act which, under the
laws of the state, constitutes a crime involving moral turpitude").
28. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 16-24-8 (2008); CAL. EDUC. CODE§ 44427 (2007); COLO.
RBN . STAT. § 22-63-301 (2007); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14 §§ 1411, 1420 (2008); GA. CODE
ANN. § 20-2-940(a)(4) (2007); HAW. REV. STAT. § 302A-609 (2008); 105 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 5/10-22.4 (2008); IND. CODE ANN.§ 20-28-7-l(a)(1) (2008); KY. REV. STAT. ANC\1. §
156.132(1) (2008); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:443(A) (2008); MD. CODE ANN. EDUC. § 6202(a)(1)(i) (2008); NEV. REV. STAT. § 391.312 (2007); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C325(e)(l)(b) (2007); OHIO. REV. CODE ANN. § 3319.16 (2008); 24 PA. STAT. ANN. § ll1122(a) (2007); S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-25-430 (2007); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 13-43-6.1
(2008); TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-5-5ll(a)(2) (2008); VT. STAT. ANN. Tit. 16 § 1752 (2007);
VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-307(A) (2008); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 118.23(3) (2007); WYO. STAT.
ANN.§ 21-7-llO(a) (2007).
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that actually define what constitutes such behavior. 29 Alaska is
one of the few jurisdictions that has actually defined immoral
conduct that is a basis for teacher dismissal. In Alaska, such
conduct is defined as the "commission of an act which, under
the laws of the state, constitutes a crime involving moral
turpitude." 30 Similarly, Louisiana's statute on removal of
teachers for immoral conduct limits its definition of immorality
to "conviction of a felony offense affecting the public morals" as
enumerated under Louisiana law. 31 For the most part,
however, statutory provisions governing morality for secondary
school teachers are usually broad or undefined. 32 In fact, some
states have left the definition of immorality to the discretion of
the school board (if such definition is warranted by the facts
and has a reasonable legal basis).33

B. Statutory Provisions Governing Morality for Postsecondary
School Teachers
In general, colleges and universities regulate the
employment of their faculty through tenure policies and
procedures. 34 In most public institutions of higher learning,
tenure is governed by statute; in most private postsecondary
educational institutions, tenure is regulated by contract. 35
Once tenure is created, it is "implemented by institutional
regulations." 36 For example, Chapter VI, Section 602 of the

29. See, e.g. , WYO. STAT. ANN.§ 2 1-7-110(a).
30 . ALAS KA STAT.§ 14.20.170(A)(2) (2008) .
81. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17: 443(C).
32. See e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-940(a)(4); HAW. REV. STAT. § 302A-609; 105
ILL. COMl'. STAT. ANN. 5/10-22.4; KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 156.132(1); MD. CODE AN:-!. § 6202(a)( 1)(i); NER. REV. STAT. § 79-827(1)(h) (2007); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-325(e)(1)(b);
OHIO. REV. CODE ANN.§ 3319.16; TENN. COD E ANN.§ 49-5-501(:3)(A) (2008); VA. CODE
ANN.§ 22.1- :l07(A); WI S. STAT. ANN.§ 118.2 3(3).
33. See, e.g., Ricci v. Davis, 627 P.2d 1111, 1118- 19 (Colo. 191l l) (construing the
statutory predecessor of COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-63-301 (2007) and stating that "i n view
of the variousness of human behavior, 'it would be folly to suggest that . . . .
'fl]mmorality' rendering one unfit to teach is a standard so clear as to leave no leeway
in determining whethe r t he facts of a particular case meet that sta ndard' ... . A school
board's application of the standard to a specific instance of teacher conduct will
therefore be sustained by a reviewing court if it is warrante d in the record and has a
reasonable basis in law") (quoting Blair v. Lovett, 582 P.2d 668, 672 (Colo. 1978)).
34. See Mary Hora, Chalk Talk: The Court and Academia: Tenure Discrimination
Claims Against Colleges and Uni versities, 30 J .L. & EDUC. 349, 350 (2001).
35. !d.
36. J. Peter Byrn e, Academic Freedom: A "Special Concern of the First
Amendment ", 99 YALE L.,J. 251, 265 (1989).
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University of North Carolina Code of the Board of Governors 37
governs academic tenure for the University of North Carolina
system, which is comprised of sixteen constituent
institutions. 38 According to the academic tenure policy, each
constituent institution prescribes the procedures "by which
decisions concerning appointment, reappointment, promotion,
and the conferral of permanent tenure shall be made." 39
An award of tenure is given to a professor after he or she
has completed a set period of employment and met certain
criteria. 40 Throughout this time of employment service, "the
university has the opportunity to assess the professor's
competence."4 1 Specifically, the university, in its deliberation
on tenure, will often consider "[l]ength of service (commonly six
years), teaching ability, research productivity, collegiality, and
service to the university and community."42 The award of
tenure is a grant of an important property right; 43 after a
faculty member has been awarded tenure, he or she may only
be dismissed for sufficient cause, financial exigency, or an
unavoidable change in university programs.44
The University of North Carolina's provisions governing

37. Chapter VI, § 602 of the University of North Carolina Code of the Board of
Governors
(2004) ,
available
at
http://www. northcarolina .ed u/con tent.php/policies/CHAPTER_VI_only_ web. htm#Sectio
n602 (last visited Oct. 18, 2008) [hereinafter UNC Code].
38. See Constituent Universities of The University of North Carolina, available at
http://www.northcarolina.edu/
content.php/campus/campusmap.htm (last visited May 3, 2008). The sixtee n
constituent schools in the University of North Carolina system are: Appalachian State
University, East Carolina University, Elizabeth City State University, Fayetteville
State University, North Carolina Agricultural and Technical State University, North
Carolina Central University, North Carolina School of the Arts, North Carolina State
University at Raleigh, The University of North Carolina at Asheville, The University of
North Carolina at Chapel Hill, The University of North Carolina at Charlotte, The
University of North Carolina at Greensboro, The University of North Carolina at
Wilmington, The University of North Carolina at Pembroke, Western Carolina
University, and Winston-Salem State University.
39. UNC Code, supra note 37.
40. Daniel E. Hall, The First Amendment Threat to Academic Tenure, 10 U. FLA.
J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 85, 88 (1998); Hora, supra note 34, at 350; see, e.g., ARK. CODE A ~N.
§ 6-63-104 (2008); TENN. CODE ANN.§ 49-8-301 (2008).
41. Hora, supra note 34, at 350.
42. Hall, supra note 40, at 88.
43. See, e.g., Gray v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Georgia, 150 F .3d 1347,
1352- 53 (11th Cir. 1998) (outlining the distinction between the grant of tenure as a
property right entitled to protection under the Fourteenth Amendment and the
untenured status as lacking the creation of a protected property interest).
44. Hall, supra note 40, at 88.
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academic tenure provide that:
A faculty member, who is the beneficiary of institutional
guarantees of tenure, shall enjoy protection against unjust
and arbitrary application of disciplinary penalties. During the
period of such guarantees, the faculty member may be
discharged or suspended from employment or diminished in
rank only for reasons of incompetence, neglect of duty, or

misconduct of such a nature as to indicate that the individual
is unfit to continue as a member of the faculty. 45

In essence, the policies of the University of North Carolina
allow for the possibility of the discharge or suspension of a
tenured professor for immoral conduct, if such conduct is "of
such a nature as to indicate that the individual is unfit to
continue as a member of the faculty." 46 North Carolina is not
the only state that allows for the possibility of immorality
constituting sufficient grounds for terminating or suspending
tenured, public university professors. Other states, like
California, have tenure policies for their public, postsecondary
institutions that embrace immorality as a basis for terminating
or dismissing tenured employees. 47
Akin to the use of the term immorality in statutes
governing secondary schools, the definition of immorality is not
always clear in postsecondary school statutes or policies
either. 48 Therefore, the application of this standard has often
been left to the judicial system. Courts have upheld immorality
as grounds for dismissal in cases of "dishonesty, sexual
harassment and extreme vulgarity." 49 For example, in Korf v.
Ball State University, 50 a tenured professor was terminated
based on ultimate findings that he made sexual advances
toward his students that resulted in some accusations of sexual
harassment. 51 The allegations of sexual harassment included
claims that the professor had made unwelcome sexual

45 . UNC Code, supra note 37, at § 603(1) (emphasis added).
46. Id.
47. See, e.g., CAL. EDUC. CODE A NN . § 87732(a) (2007) (providing that tenured
community college employees may be dismissed for immoral or unprofessional
conduct); CAL. EDUC. CODE ANN . § 89535(a) (2007) (providing that t enured California
State University employees may be dismissed for immoral conduct).
48. See, e.g., CAL. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 87732(a); CAL. EDUC. CODE ANN. §
89535(a) .
49. See McGee, supra note 25, at 596.
50. 726 F.2d 1222 (7th Cir. 1984).
51. !d. at 1224-25.
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overtures and offered students good grades in exchange for
sexual acts. 52 After his termination, the tenured professor
brought suit against the university, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1983, claiming that the termination of his employment violated
his "constitutional rights to substantive and procedural due
process, equal protection, free speech, freedom of association,
and privacy." 53 The federal district court granted the
defendants' summary judgment motion, based on the Eleventh
Amendment and qualified immunity. 54
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit addressed the substantive
merits of the plaintiffs claims; affirmed the district court's
decision; and ultimately upheld the professor's dismissal,
finding that the tenured professor was discharged from his
employment for engaging in the unethical conduct of exploiting
students for his private advantage, which qualified as
proscribed conduct by the Faculty Handbook.55 Further, the
court determined that the university's action in dismissing the
teacher was "rationally related to its responsibility to establish
and maintain high ethical standards within the University in
order to maintain a proper academic environment." 56
In the Korf case, the judicial system provided the contours
of a definition for immoral or unethical conduct that could
provide a sufficient basis for termination of a tenured
postsecondary
educator.
However,
overall,
judicial
interpretations of the statutory provisions governing educator
morality have provided a less than consistent approach on the
definition of immoral conduct.

C. The Legal Standard Applied for Statutory Provisions
Governing Educator Morality
Most jurisdictions require that, in order for statutory
morals clauses to be enforced against secondary and
postsecondary school educators as a basis for termination,
there must be a "nexus" between the challenged conduct of the
teacher and the t eacher's duties. 57 Some courts have referred to
52. ld. at 122 4.
53. Id. at 1225.
54. I d.
55 . Id. at 1 227~30.
56. ld. at 1229.
57. See. e.g., Morri son v. State Bd. of Educ .. 461 P.2d 375 (Cal. 1969). However.
not all jurisdictions apply this nexus test , as will be outlined towards th e end of thi s
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the nexus required to justify a school's decision of taking
adverse action against an educator for immorality as a
"rational nexus," 58 a "sufficient nexus," 59 or a "substantial
nexus." 60 Regardless of the classification used, most courts will
not uphold the discipline or dismissal of a teacher for
immorality unless the alleged immoral conduct has a relation
to or affects the teacher's work. 61
The California case of Morrison u. State Board of Education
serves as substantial precedent for these types of findings. 62 In
Morrison, the California Supreme Court reversed and
remanded a lower court decision affirming a school board's
decision to revoke a t eacher's license on the ground of immoral
and unprofessional conduct and acts of moral turpitude after a
male public school teacher became involved for one week in a
physical (but non-criminal) homosexual relationship with
another teacher in the public school system. 63 The court
determined that the Board of Education could not characterize
the conduct in the case as "immoral," "unprofessional," or
"involving moral turpitude within the meaning of [the state's
education code,] unless that conduct indicate[d] that the
[teacher was] unfit to teach." 64
The criteria that the Morrison court used in determining
whether the teacher's conduct had a "nexus" to his duties were:
(1) the likelihood that the conduct may have adversely affected
section.
58. Golden v. Bd. of Educ. of County of Harrison, 285 S.E.2d 665, 668 \W.Va.
198 1) (finding that a school board's dismissal of a high school guidance counselor for
felony s hoplifting, pursuant to a state statute that allowed for dismissal for immorality,
was improper because there was no proof of a "rational nexus" between the conduct and
her duties); see also Rogliano v. Fayette County Bd. of Educ. , 347 S.E.2d 220, 224
(W.Va. 1986).
59. Lite v. Hancock Place Sch. Dist., 701 S.W.2d 500, 506 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985)
(finding a "sufficient nexus" between sexual abuse engaged in by a fourth-grade
teacher and his responsibilities as a teacher such that his termination was justified
under an immorality state statute).
60. Rado v. Bd. of Educ. of Borough of Naugatuck, 583 A.2d 102, 108 (Conn. 1990)
(finding a "substantial nexus" between a high school teacher's intentional tampering
with the school telephone system and his duties at the school, which sufficiently
established termination grounds).
61. See, e.g. , Rogliano, 347 S .E.2d at 225 (reversing the dismi ssa l of a permanent
substitute teacher for immoral conduct based on a misdemeanor charge for possession
of a small amount of marijuana in his home as there was an insufficient nexus between
this conduct and his occupational responsibilities).
62. 461 P.2d at 375.
63. /d. at :377-78.
64. ld. at 386 (interna l quota tions omitted).
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students or fellow teachers; (2) the degree of such adversity
anticipated; (3) the proximity or remoteness in time of the
conduct; (4) the type of teaching certificate held by the party
involved; (5) the extenuating or aggravating circumstances, if
any, surrounding the conduct; (6) the praiseworthiness or
blameworthiness of the motives resulting in the conduct; (7)
the likelihood of the recurrence of the questioned conduct; and
(8) the extent to which disciplinary action may inflict an
adverse impact or chilling effect upon the constitutional rights
of the teacher involved or other teachers. 65 Notably, these oftcited Morrison criteria, which can be used to determine
whether a "nexus" exists, are not based exclusively on a
teacher's classroom proficiency. 66
Although many jurisdictions utilize the Morrison factors in
their determinations of nexus requirements, 67 not all
jurisdictions require that an applied "nexus" exist between the
allegedly immoral behavior of the teacher and his or her ability
to perform the job. 68 Oftentimes, this lack of an explicit nexus
requirement is justified by a finding of an implicit connection
between the severity of the conduct at issue and the educator's
lack of fitness to teach. 69 For example, in Denton v. South
Kitsap School District, the school board discharged a teacher
who had sexual relations with a student resulting in the
student becoming pregnant and the teacher subsequently
marrying the student. 70 The Denton Court explained that it
declined to set a requirement of showing an adverse effect upon
the "fitness to teach" by the alleged conduct "where the sexual
misconduct complained of directly involves a teacher and a
minor student." 71
A review of the statutory provisions regarding the morality
of secondary and postsecondary educators (and the cases that
construe such provisions) demonstrates the variety of
approaches that states and courts have taken in regulating
65. ld. at 386.
66. See id.
67. See, e.g., Briggs v. Bd. of Dirs. of Hinton Cmty. Sch. Dist., 282 N.W.2d 740,
742-43 (Iowa 1979); Fisher v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 622, 357 N.W.2d 152, 155-56
(Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
68. See e.g., Hainline v. Bond, 824 P.2d 959 (Kan. 1992); Denton v. S. Kitsap Sch.
Dist., 516 P.2d 1080 (Wa. Ct. App. 1973).
69. Denton, 516 P.2d at 1080.
70. ld. at 1081.
71. ld. at 1082.
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educator conduct. Because jurisdictions have not been
completely consistent in their implementation and application
of these statutes, many schools (both public and private,
secondary and postsecondary) are choosing to use employment
contracts as another basis for enforcing educator morality.

IV. APPLICATIONS OF CONTRACTUAL MORALS CLAUSES FOR
SECONDARY SCHOOL EDUCATORS

Teachers and other secondary school authorities stand in
loco parentis, and thus they bear "the responsibility of the duty
to protect students.'>72 The conditions in which educators are
deemed to be in loco parentis depend, in part, on the nature of
the secondary school and on the educational activity at issue. 73
"When parents place minor children in private schools for their
education, the teachers and administrators of those schools
stand in loco parentis over the children entrusted to them." 74
Generally, public secondary schools do not "have such a degree
of control over children as to give rise to a constitutional 'duty
to protect"'; 75 however, "for many purposes, 'school authorities
act in loco parentis' ... with the power and indeed the duty to
'inculcate the habits and manners of civility."' 76
In light of this in loco parentis responsibility, many
secondary schools (both public and private) 77 are instituting
safeguards for students through a contractual morals clause
requirement as a condition of teacher employment and
retention. 78 The inclusion of these types of clauses m

72. Todd A. DeMitchell, The Duty to Protect: Blackstone's Doctrine of In Loco
Pa:centis: A Lens for Viewing the Sexual Abuse of Students, 2002 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 17,
26 (2002). In loco parentis is defined as standing "in the place of a parent." See BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 803 (8th ed. 2004).
73. See, e.g., Anne·Marie Harris & Kenneth B. Grooms, A New Lesson Plan for
Educational Institutions: Expanded Rules Governing Liability Under Title IX of the
Education Amendments of 1972 for Student and Faculty Sexual Harassment , 8 AM. U.
J. GENDER Soc . POL'Y & L. 575, 619 (2000).
74. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 654 (1995).
75. Id. at 655 (quoting DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs. , 489
u.s. 189, 200 (1989)).
76. Id. (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681, 684
(1986)).
77. Examples of such contractual morals clauses can be found in both the public
and private secondary school context. However, recent media coverage of such clauses
demonstrates that these types of contractual clauses tend to be more prevalent in
private schools.
78. See, e.g., Smulevitz, supra note 4, at B3 (describing how it is standard practice

80

B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL

[2009

educational contracts has resulted from both internal 79 and
external 80 calls for reform. Oftentimes, these employment
conditions are supplementary to or reflective of the governing
state's statutory scheme or a state administrative agency's
regulatory structure that imposes certain implied morals
requirements on all secondary school teachers. 81
As a result of this institution of morals clauses as a
condition for employment and retention, many secondary
school teachers have been discharged or disciplined for conduct
that has taken place both on and off school grounds. 82 The
enforcement of these contractual morals clauses often mirrors
how school systems have enforced statutory morality
requirements for employment. 83 As such, it is important to

for all educational contracts in an Indiana school district to contain morals clauses);
but see Sandi Switzer, Residents Petition for Firing of Danby Principal, RUTLAND
HERALD (VT), Nov. 16, 2005 (stating that no educational contracts in the state of
Vermont contain morals clauses).
79. See, e.g., Tustin Amole, Academy Board Agrees to Amend Morals Clause Intent Wasn't to Follow Teachers into the Bedroom, Chairman Says, ROCKY MOUNTAIN
NEWS (Colorado), Apr. 12, 1995, at 13A (explaining a charter school board's decision to
amend a contractual morals clause that defined immorality as "evidence of sexual
behavior outside of holy wedlock or legal matrimony; or felonious conduct."); see also
Mede Nix, Rojas Suggests Morals Clause in Contract, FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGIL\M,
May 4, 1999, at 4 (outlining how a Dallas school superintendent finalist, Bill Rojas,
with two past DWI arrests, suggested the insertion of an alcohol-related morals clause
into his contract if hired); Linda K. Wertheimer, DISD Board Hires Rojas as
Superintendent, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, May 26, 1999, at 1A (describing how the selfsuggested morals clause was inserted into the contract upon Rojas' hiring as Dallas
Schools' Superintendent).
80. See, e.g., Renate Robey, Ouster Bid Splits School-Eaglecrest Principal
Assailed Over Affair, THE DENVER POST, Apr. 24, 1991, at 1B (stating that parents
"suggested that a 'morals' clause be added to [a school] district's personnel policies"
after the revelation of an extra-marital affair between a high school principal and
music teacher).
81. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-325 (e)(1)(b) (providing that "[n]o career
employee shall be dismissed or demoted or employed on a part-time basis except for
one or more of the following ... immorality."); Morrison, 461 P.2d at 377 (construing
California's state educational code in a determination of whether a teacher's
engagement in a homosexual relationship constituted moral turpitude).
82. See, e.g., Joe Sylvester & Ed Fletcher, Critics, Friends See Jerrytone as Man of
Many Faces - The Local Teacher Faces Court Action on Drug-Related and Sex
Harassment Charges, TIMES LEADER (Wilkes Barre, PA), May 28, 2000, at 1A
(discussing how a secondary school teacher's contractual morals clause might be
implicated if he were to be convicted of allowing controlled substances in the classroom
and sexual harassment); Rod Thomson, Popular Coach Broke His Contract, as an
Employee and as a Role Model, SARASOTA HERALD-TRIBUNE (Fla.), May 31, 2002, at
BSl (describing how a physical education teacher and coach was fired from his position
at a Catholic school after fathering a child out of wedlock pursuant to a contractual
morals clause).
83. John Trebilcock, Comment, Off Campus: School Board Control Over Teacher
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briefly summarize the most prevalent cases in which educators
have lost secondary school employment for statutory
"immorality" or "moral turpitude." 84 There have been a
multitude of cases in which courts have found conviction of
criminal activity to be a sufficient trigger for the dismissal or
sanction of teachers under state statutory schemes. 85 Arrests
for criminal activity have also provided the impetus for
disciplinary conduct under state statutes. 86 Furthermore,
certain sexual activity has constituted a reason for the
discipline or firing of secondary school teachers per immorality
statutes. 87 Other schools have justified dismissal decisions
based on dishonest conduct engaged in by secondary school
teachers.s 8
As pr'eviously explained, although many courts-in order to
uphold a dismissal based on statutory immorality or moral
turpitude-require a rational nexus 89 between the allegedly
immoral activity at issue and the teacher's performance in the

Conduct, 35 TULSA L.J. 445, 453-60 (2000).
84. 70 OKL. STAT. § 6-101.22(A)(7).
85. See, e.g., Kenai Peninsula Borough Bd. of Educ. v. Brown, 691 P.2d 1034, 1041
(Alaska 1984) (upholding the substantive determination of the school board that the
conviction of a high school teacher of diversion of electricity constituted a crime of
moral turpitud e, which served as the basis for the teacher's dismi ssal); McCullough v.
Illinois State Bd. of Educ., 562 N.E.2d 1233, 1238 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (affirming the
dismissal of a teacher based on multiple criminal convictions for failure to pay taxes);
Chicago Bd. of Educ. v. Payne, 430 N.E.2d 310, 317 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981) (affirming the
dismissal of secondary school teacher who pled guilty to misdem eanor possession of
marijuana) ; but see Hoagla nd v. Mou nt Vernon Sch. Dist. , 623 P.2d 1156, 1159 (Wash.
1981) (remanding for evidentiary hearing a dismissal of a secondary school teacher
based on a conviction for grand larceny through the purchase of a stolen motorcycle).
86. See, e.g., Dan McFeely, Principal Will Respond to Theft Charge Today,
TNDJANAPOLJ S STAR, Mar. 20, 2000, at B1 (describing how a secondary school ed ucator
was placed on administrative leave after being arrested for shoplifting curtains); Paul
Riede & Edwin Acevedo, Baldwinsville School Chief Resigns, POST-STANDARD
(Syracuse, NY), Aug. 6, 2002, at A1(stating that school su perintendent resigned after
arrest for public lewdness despite the lack of a morals clause in his contract).
87. See, e.g., Toney v. Fairbanks N. Star Borough Sch . Dist. Bd. of Educ., 881
P.2d. 1112, 1116 (Alaska 1994) (affirming t he dismissal of a teacher for statutory
immoral conduct where t he teacher had engaged in a sexual relationship with a minor
in another state prior to his employment, which constituted a crime in both Alaska and
in the other state); In Re Etienne, 460 N. W.2d 109, 113 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990)
(affir min g a school board's decision to disch arge a secondary school teacher based on
allegatio ns of sexu al activity with a student).
88. See, e.g., Swinderman v. Dover City Sch . Dist. Bd. of Edu c., No. 91AP110092,
1992 Ohio App. LEXIS 2187, at *8-10 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 20, 1992) (affirming school
hoard's termination decision of secondat·y school teacher based on falsification of sick
le.ave).
89. Stelzer v. State Bd. of Educ. , 595 N.E.2d 489, 492 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991).
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school, 90 such a showing of a nexus is not a requirement in all
states or courts. 91 Because various court decisions potentially
require a showing of a nexus requirement, arguably such a
requirement might also be imposed upon any school system
that seeks or has sought to terminate an employee pursuant to
a contractual morals clause. However, the expansive principles
of freedom of contract, which generally allow "parties [to]
contract as they wish," 92 which "courts will enforce ... without
passing on their substance," 93 and which are "rooted in the
notion that it is in the public interest to recognize that
individuals have broad powers to order their own affairs," 94
provide a strong argument in the alternative. An examination
of how secondary schools are actually utilizing contractual
morals clauses as conditions of initial and continued
employment of teachers illustrates that most of these cases fall
on the side of broad freedom of contract rather than on the side
of a process nexus requirement.
Secondary schools have sought dismissal or discipline of
educators, pursuant to contractual morals clauses, for a broad
range of "immoral" conduct. The breadth of the conduct, which
is regulated by contractual morals clauses that are used as
conditions for employment for secondary school instructors, has
led to employment disputes. 95 Some conduct would likely
90. See, e.g., Morrison v. State Bd. of Educ., 461 P.2d 375, 377, 386-87 (Cal.
1969).
91. See, e.g., Stelzer, 595 N.E.2d at 492 (stating that the Morrison nexus
requirement has not been adopted by the Ohio Supreme Court in interpreting the
state's educational dismissal immorality statute); but see Freisthler v. State Bd. of
Educ., No. 1-02-36, 2002 Ohio App. LEXIS 4975, at *14-15 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 20,
2002) (finding that "implicit in the wording 'conduct that is unbecoming to the person's
profession,' ... is a requirement that the conduct in some way affect the individual's
ability to teach. To decide what constitutes conduct unbecoming a teacher without any
regard to teaching, is to base the decision solely on the Board's determination of what
is unacceptable behavior and 'such a statute, unless narrowed by clear and well-known
standards, affords too great a potential for arbitrary and discriminatory application
and administration"' (quoting Morrison, 461 P.2d at 383, n.15).
92. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS ch. 8, introductory cmt. (1981).
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. See Lawrence Goodman, Archdiocese Hit on Morals Clause in Teacher Pact,
NEW YORK DAILY NEWS, Sept. 9, 1996, at 25 (detailing a protest of a secondary school
teachers' union of the Archdiocese of New York's attempt to insert a morals clause into
employment contracts that would give it the right to fire teachers if "they violated
official Catholic dogma in their private lives"); see also .John McGourty, Teachers Pichet
in Bristol, TIMES (Trenton, N.J.), Sept. 5, 1997, at A2 (discussing how a rewording of a
contractual morals clause in private high school teachers contracts was one issue of a
labor dispute between a teachers' union and the Camden Diocese).
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qualify, without argument, as a violation of morality clauses.
However, in many other instances, secondary schools have
exercised such expansive authority in their determinations of
what could be considered breaches of contractual morals
clauses that arguments could be made that such dismissals
constitute breaches of contract on the part of the school
systems. For example, a private high school art and religion
instructor, "who pose[d] nude for figure drawing studies in a
private Toledo studio, [was] asked by school officials to resign
because they sa[id] he [was] violating a morals clause in his
contract." 96 Such an operation of a contractual morals clause
might be the basis for litigation; however, given the American
judicial system's reliance on the key principle of freedom of
contract and the fact that the school in question was a private
school, such litigation might be quickly dismissed.
Other conduct that has been the basis for termination of
secondary employment poses some similarly problematic
aspects. Several secondary educators have faced dismissal from
their private school positions as a result of parenting children
out of wedlock. 97 One such educator was offered a new position
as a coach and social studies teacher at a nearby public high
school within two months of his firing, highlighting the
potential differences between the exercise and construction of
contractual morals clauses by a private secondary school versus
that of a public secondary school. 98
Interestingly, some secondary schools have extended the
limit of morals clauses to apply, not only to the educator, but to
the students for whom the educator has responsibility. One
such example took place when a public high school principal
allegedly demanded that a football coach and teacher sign a
contract that contained a morals clause with respect to the
conduct of football players (both on and off campus), which
would allow for the coach's discipline if any of his eighty-five
football players engaged in misconduct.99 Rather than agree to

96. Art Teacher's Ouster Sought on Moral Grounds, JOURNA L GAZETTE (Fort
Way ne , Ind.). June 13, 1996, at lC .
97. See, e.g., Roland, supra note 6, at Al; Dan Ventura, Daddy's Got a New dab,
Baby - Norton Welcomes Coach Fired as Unwed Father , THE BOSTO N HERALD, Ma y 27,
2006, a t 6.
98. See Ve ntura, su.pra note 97, a t 6.
99 . See Brian McCready, Gridders at Foran Push for Coach's Return, NEW HAVEN
REmsn:R (Conn.) , Apr. 1:3, 2002, at B2.
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such a contractual requirement, the coach quit his position. 100
Although the coach then immediately reapplied for his position
with overwhelming community support, another individual was
hired as his replacement. 101 It seems that this type of morals
clause may constitute the outermost bounds with respect to the
use of these contractual clauses as conditions for employment
in a secondary school context.
However, a recent case of morals clauses and secondary
school employment seemingly pushes these limits even further.
A Wisconsin French teacher, Kelly Romenesko, was fired from
her position at a private, Catholic secondary school in 2004 due
to an alleged violation of her contractual morals clause; the
claimed violation was that Romenesko had "undergone in vitro
fertilization, a procedure the [Catholic] church opposes." 102
Romenesko filed suit against the school system, claiming that
the system had violated the state Fair Employment Act by
discriminating against her on the basis of sex, because she was
pregnant. 103 In January 2007, "an administrative law judge
found probable cause that [the school system] discriminated
against Romenesko because she was pregnant." 104 After
negotiations between the parties floundered, 105 a three-day
hearing was scheduled before an administrative law judge of
the state Department of Workforce Development. 106 However,
before the hearing began and before a decision on the merits
was made, Romenesko settled with the school system. 107 So,
whether or not this type of enforcement of a contractual morals
clause would be upheld by a court will have to be determined in
another case.
A review of the use of contractual morals clauses as a basis

100. See Brian McCready, Foran Coach Who Quit Wants to Return to ,Job; Charges
School Principal Forced Him from Post, NEW HAVEN REGISTER (Conn.), Apr. 12, 2002,
at C6.
101. See Manuela Da Costa-Fernandes, Beler Loses Bid for Coaching .Job, NF:W
HAVEN REGIST!m (Conn.), May 17, 2002, at Bl.
102. Susan Squires, Former ACES Teacher Wins In Vitro Probable-Cause Ruling,
POST-CRESCENT (Appleton, Wis.), Feb. 22, 2007, at 1A.
103. See id.
104. ,J.E. Espino, Talks Fail in In Vitro Case, POST-CRESCENT (Appleton, Wis.),
Mar. 6, 2007, at 1C.
105. See id.
106. See Appleton Teacher Who Had In Vitro Gets Hearing, CAPITAL TIMES
(Madison, Wis.), June 4, 2007, at Bl.
107. See Susan Squires, Romenesko Relieved That Ordeal is Over, POST-CRESCENT
(Appleton, Wis.), Aug. 29, 2007, at 2A.
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for termination of secondary school educators demonstrates
that the morals clause serves as another device to be used by a
school system when an adverse employment decision must be
made. The inclusion of morals clauses within education
contracts bolsters the power that many secondary schools
already have, pursuant to a state statutory scheme, when an
educator engages in immoral conduct. However, the extent of
enforcement of these types of contractual clauses may prove to
be the source of future litigation in the secondary educational
context.
V. APPLICATIONS OF CONTRACTUAL MORALS FOR
POSTSECONDARY SCHOOL EDUCATORS

Just as in the secondary school context, contractual morals
clauses are increasingly becoming used as a condition of
employment for postsecondary educators. 108 Also akin to the
morality requirements for secondary school instructors,
postsecondary school employees' dismissals based on
contractual morals provisions often echo dismissals based on
statutory definitions of immorality. 109 The problematic nature
of these statutory definitions for secondary school teachers
equally apply to postsecondary schoolteachers. Essentially,
immorality has been a "justifiable reason for firing a tenured
professor, but what constitutes immorality is not always
clear." 110 So, a concise review of cases in which university and
college educators have been discharged pursuant to state
statute is merited.
Postsecondary institutions have determined that criminal
convictions qualify as immoral conduct to justify dismissal of

108. See, e.fL .Jim Leggett, LC Policy Encourages Alcohol Abstinence, ALEXANDRJA
TOW N TALK (La.), Apr. 13, 2006, at l -3A (describing how the contracts for
Louisiana College, a private , Baptist college, would contain a new clause stating that
employees a re "expected to abstain from serving, using or advocating the u se of
alcoholic beverages in public and/or in settings in which students are or are likely to be
present excP.pt in the case of co mmunion").
109. See, e.g., Copeland & Murry, supra note 24 at 233.
llO . McGee, su.pra note 2fi, at 596 (stating that "courts have upheld dishonesty,
sexual harass ment and extreme vulgarity a s valid grounds for dismissal [of tenured
professors]," but that "other courts have struck down immora lity as grounds for
di smissal because 'immorality means different things to different people, and its
definition depends on the idiosyncrasies of the individual school hoard members'" and
because ·'the potential tor arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement is inherent in such
a statute'') .
DAILY
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educators under state statutory schemes. 111 There also have
been instances in which universities have sought the dismissal
of professors based upon somewhat ambiguous claims of
violation of "trust," rather than on direct claims tied to criminal
convictions. 112 Further, like secondary educational cases,
certain sexual activity has served as a basis for the termination
of employment of postsecondary educators. 113 Additionally,
plagiarism and dishonest conduct have been interpreted to
meet statutory immorality requirements in the dismissal of
postsecondary educators. 114
Interestingly, some courts have made specific distinctions
with respect to conduct that could constitute a valid basis for
dismissal at the secondary level, but not at the postsecondary
level. In Texton v. Hancock, 115 a tenured instructor was
discharged from a junior college for "immorality, misconduct in
office and willful neglect of duty." 116 Specifically, findings were
made that the instructor "discussed the personal problems and
grades of students with other members of the class; advised her
students to overrule another teacher; used profanity in the
presence of a student; [and] made general statements ... that
all men are inadequate." 117 Additionally, findings were made
that:
Texton requested that a student have an affair with her exhusband; that she gave a class party and was seen there
drinking a beer; that she visited the home of a student after
midnight, bringing along her husband and two other men and
carrying beer; [and] that she 'passed out' in the student's

111. ld.
112. See, e.g., Joseph Kirby & V. Dian Haynes, Teachers Find Public Eye Doesn't
Blinh - Educators Say They're Held to Higher Standard, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Feb. 28,
1992, at 1 (outlining how the Provost of Northwestern University sought the dismissal
of a tenured professor after said professor pled guilty to a felony embezzlem ent
conviction for cashing Social Security checks for his deceased mother, not because of
the admission to the felony, but beca use the professor "breached t he faculty-student
trust").
11:3. See, e.g., Lehmann v. Bd. of Trustees, 576 P.2d :397, :399 (Wash. 1978)
(affirming the dismissal of a tenured faculty member at a private college for sexual
misconduct).
114. See, e.g., Yu v. Peterson, 13 F.3d 141 3, 1417 (lOth Cir. 1993) (affirming t he
dismissal of a tenured professor for plagiarism); Jawa v. Fayetteville State Univ., 426
F. Supp. 218 (E.D.N.C. 1976) (affirming the dismissal of a tenured fa culty member at a
public university for engaging in dishonest conduct with his superiors).
115. 359 So. 2d 895 (Fla . Ct. App. 1978).
116. Id. at 896.
117. Id.
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living room after drinking beer. 118
Because of these findings, the College Board of Trustees
discharged Texton; this discharge was sustained by the state
Department of Education. 119 Texton appealed and the Court of
Appeal of Florida ordered the reversal of the discharge. In its
decision of reversal, the court specifically stated:
If a school teacher is responsible for teaching students in their
formative years and commits acts of immorality after school
hours, such acts may be indirectly related to misconduct in
office .... Here Ms. Texton's conduct must be judged in the
context of her more liberal, open, robust college surroundings.
She is not teaching children of tender years in an elementary
school. Her acts have little or no connection whatsoever with
morality, misconduct in office or willful neglect particularly
when considering that the complainants were junior college
students, many of them older and working full-time ,
attending classes part-time or at night. 120
While courts, like the Texton court, have stated limits to the
imposition of morality statutory requirements as conditions of
employment for postsecondary instructors, scenarios that
involve contractual morals clauses as conditions of similar
employment tend to have much more extensive reach. With
respect to the use of contractual morals clauses as a basis for
termination or discipline of postsecondary educators, the
triggering conduct can be much broader than the conduct that
is at issue in a statutory dismissal. For example, allegations of
criminal activity, even if ultimately found to be without merit
by a court, may be a sufficient basis for dismissal pursuant to a
contractual morals clause. 121 Allegations of academic fraud
may also suffice for the operation of a contractual morals
clause and the termination of postsecondary educators. 122
While this type of conduct may lead to a valid termination
118. fd.
119. ld.
120. !d. at 897 .
121. See Andrew Miller, Citadel, Taaffe Settle Lawsuit , POST AND COURIER
(Charleston, S.C.), May 7, 1997, at Cl (describing how the Citadel fired the fo otball
h ead coach for a violation of his morals clause rela ted to two DUI cha rges, of which the
coach was eventually acquitted, how the coach brought a breach of contract suit
following his termination, and how the lawsuit was eventually settled).
122. See, e.g., Report: Minn. Staff Ji'abricated Grades, PHILADELPHIA DAILY NEWS,
Apr. 15, 1999, at 85 (discussing how allegations of faculty awarding false grades to
college athletes were being investigated by outside law firms and implying that
disciplinary action could result based on said all egations).
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of an employment contract in a postsecondary setting, the
dearth of case law on this precise subject matter should urge
caution for postsecondary institutions that wish to utilize
morals clauses as conditions for employment. Unlike the
secondary school examples of terminations based on morals
clause violations, the postsecondary educational context lacks a
substantial amount of precedent in this field. It appears,
however, that as more universities and colleges adopt morals
clauses as contractual requirements, the body of case law will
concomitantly expand as well. Further, the constitutional
limitations of these moral requirements will cabin the powers
of secondary and postsecondary administrators.

VI. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS OF REQUIRING MORALS
CLAUSES FOR SECONDARY AND POSTSECONDARY EDUCATORS
As demonstrated, ambiguity and uncertainty as to the
validity of a school's actions of terminating or disciplining a
teacher for moral misconduct may arise whether such action is
based on statutory or contractual provisions. This ambiguity
can become especially pointed when the school's action poses
an alleged conflict between the teacher's work life and her
personal life. 123 Additionally, a multitude of questions are
raised by requiring teachers to comply with morality clauses,
which include: (1) what conduct constitutes immoral behavior,
and who makes the judgment call as to whether the teacher's
behavior is considered immoral?; (2) how far can a school delve
into the personal lives of teachers in order to actually enforce
these morals clauses?; and (3) is there a realm of privacy that a
teacher in fact has, where his or her conduct should not
constitute "immoral behavior"? These questions demonstrate
the fact that enforcing morals clauses against teachers carries
a potential of infringing upon their constitutional rights.
Despite their position and influence as role models,
teachers "are not relegated to a watered-down version of
constitutional rights." 124 They maintain the constitutional
123. See, e.g., Pettit v. State Bd. of Educ., 513 P.2d 889 (Cal. 1973) (upholding the
revocation of an elementary school teacher's license based on her sexual activity in a
"swingers club" outside of work, and that did not involve any students). It is important
to note t hat, though the court does reason into the conflict between the teacher's work
life and her personal life, the court also faces a situation where the teach er's sexual
activity was allegedly illegal. Id. at 890-92.
124. Garrity v. New J ersey, 385 U.S. 49 3, 500 (1967).

1]

MORALS CLAUSES FOR EDUCATORS

89

rights available to all individuals. Clearly, these constitutional
rights are available to educators in public institutions. 125 In
order for teachers employed by private schools to demonstrate
that the private schools' actions violated their constitutional
rights, the teachers must prove that the schools' actions
constituted state action. 126 "Conduct that is formally 'private'
may become so entwined with governmental policies or so
impregnated with a governmental character as to become
subject to the constitutional limitations placed upon state
action." 127
This conduct is not easily determined. 128 However, private
schools that "clearly perform functions governmental in nature,
such as providing higher education to and exerc1smg
substantial dominion over its students . . . may be
constrained ... by the requirements of the Constitution." 129
Moreover, courts have stated that "support to [private schools]
'through any arrangement, management, funds, or property'
would [seemingly] inject state action into [the school's]
conduct". 130 As to the validity of constitutional claims brought
by teachers who have willingly entered into contracts with
terms requiring that they refrain from immoral behavior, these
claims seem uncertain given that parties have the freedom to
contract as they wish and courts usually enforce these
provisions. 131
In most cases where claims of constitutional violations
resulting from enforcing statutory morals clauses upon
teachers have been raised, the following rights have been
implicated: due process, privacy, freedom of speech, freedom of
association, and equal protection. The effect of requiring
teacher morality on each of these constitutional rights will be
discussed separately.

125. See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506
(1969) (stating th at teachers do not "shed their constitutional rights . . . at the
schoolhouse gate").
126. See Buckton v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 366 F. Supp. 1152, 1156 (D.
M ass. 1973).
127. Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 299 (1966).
128. See id. ("What is 'private' action and what is 'state' action is not always easy
to determin e.").
129. Buckton, 366 F. Supp. at 1156.
130. See id. (quoting Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 19 (1958)).
1:31. See RESTATEMENT (SECONO) OF CONTRACTS, su.pra note 93, a t ch. 8,
introductory cmt.
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A. Due Process Rights
Teachers possess important due process rights under the
Constitution. 132 The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
provide that no person shall be deprived of "life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law." 133 The Supreme Court
has interpreted this clause as containing both a substantive
and a procedural component. 134

1. Procedural due process
Procedural due process challenges focus on whether the
government has followed adequate procedures in depriving a
person of life, liberty, or property. 135 The property interests
required for due process consist of more than abstract needs,
desires, or unilateral expectations of benefits or privileges. 136
Instead, a person must have "a legitimate claim of entitlement"
to a benefit to have a property interest in that benefit. 137 As
such, a nontenured educator has no constitutional right,
flowing from procedural due process, to a pre-termination
hearing at the end of an employment contract period unless
there is a loss of "liberty" or "property." 138 Conversely, a
"tenured university professor has a property interest in his
position, and thus cannot be deprived of that position without
due process." 139
Furthermore, courts have held that once an existing
property or liberty right has been established, procedural due
process requires that an educator with such a right be given
adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard. 14 For
instance, in Stovall v. Huntsville City Board of Education, even

°

132. See Fulmer, supra note 24, a t 283.
133. U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
134. See, e.g., Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292 (1993) (stating that the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments' guarantees of "due process of law" includes a procedural
component and substantive component).
135. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Procedural Due Process Claims, 16 TOURO L. REV.
871, 871 (2000).
136. See Bd. of Regents of State Colis. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972) (finding no
Fourteenth Amendment property interest sufficient to grant a procedural hearing
where a university declined to renew a contract of a nontenured faculty member).
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. San Filippo v. Bongiovanni, 961 F.2d 1125, 1134 (3d Cir. 1992).
140. Stovall v. Huntsville City Bd. of Educ ., 602 So. 2d 407, 408-09 (Ala. Civ. App.
1992).
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an untenured teacher had a property right entitling him to
procedural due process. 141 In Stovall, an untenured teacher
was arrested for possession of crack cocaine, the school system
superintendent recommended that the teacher's employment
contract be cancelled, a hearing was held, and subsequently,
the school system Board of Education (the "board") voted to
affirm the cancellation of the contract. 142 As a result, the
teacher filed a lawsuit claiming that his due process rights
were violated. 143 The court reasoned that, although the board
was entitled to dismiss or suspend the teacher for immorality
under a state statute, the teacher had a one-year contract and
had an expectation of one year's employment that constituted a
property interest. 144 This property interest entitled the nontenured teacher to procedural due process. 145 However, the
court found that the board fulfilled these procedural due
process requirements by giving the teacher notice of the
grounds for the proposed dismissal and of his right to a hearing
before the board, at which he could present evidence, as well as
an opportunity to be heard.
Consistent with the findings of Stovall, courts hold that
once an existing property or liberty right has been established,
procedural due process requires that an educator with such a
right be given adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard.
146 The opportunity to be heard must be provided "at a
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner." 147
Generally, this means that a hearing must be conducted
before a property or liberty right is terminated. 148 A procedural
due process challenge on this point was raised in Ashlie v.
Chester- Upland School District, where a teacher had been
employed by a school district prior to her sex change operation
transforming her from a man to a woman. 149 When the teacher
returned for the next school year as a woman, the school
141. !d.
142. I d.
143. ld. at 409.
144. I d.
145. I d.
146. Brown v. Bathke, 566 F.2d 588, 591 (8th Cir. 1977) (stating that a teacher's
one-year contract created a property interest subject to procedural due process
protections).
147. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965).
148. See Roth , 408 U.S. at 570 n. 7.
149. No. 78-4037, 1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12516, at *1 (E.D. Pa. May 9, 1979).
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district, in compliance with Pennsylvania law, dismissed her
for incompetency, immorality and other improper conduct that
was potentially psychologically damaging to students, without
a pre-dismissal hearing. 150 The court found that the state law
allowing termination of the teacher without the benefit of a
prior hearing was unconstitutional, and, as a result, the
teacher's procedural due pr ocess rights were violated. 151 The
Ashlie court determined that the school district, not the court,
was the appropriate entity to deter mine whether the teacher
should be terminated and ordered that a hearing be held by the
school district so that this determination could be made. 152
Further, the court ordered, "at the minimum, reinstatement [of
the teacher] to a suspended status with back pay pending the
outcome of the school board hearing" as a cure for the
procedural due process defect. 153
In addition to the general requirements of notice a nd an
opportunity to be heard, to avoid procedural due process
challenges, statutory and contractual morals clauses for
teachers cannot be unconstitutionally vague; that is, they
must: (1) be sufficiently clear as to give fair warning of the
conduct and (2) provide a standard or guide against which
conduct can be uniformly judged by the courts a nd
administrative agencies. 154 However, sta tutory provisions
imposing morality upon teachers have been challenged as being
unconstitutionally vague. 155 In particular, arguments have
been made that these statutory morality clauses do not provide
an opportunity to know what conduct is prohibited, so as to
avoid that type of conduct. 156 In response to such arguments ,
while some courts have upheld these statutory morals clauses
based on a determination that they are not unconstitutionally
150. ld. at *2.
151. l d. at *6.
152. l d. at *9- 10.
153. ld. at *11.
154. See Mo rrison v. State Bd. of Educ., 461 P.2d 375, 387 (Ca l. 1969) ("Civi l as
well as crimin al statutes must be sufficiently clear as to gi ve a fair warning of the
conduct prohibited, and they must provide a standard or guide against which conduct
ca n be uniformly judged by courts and administrative agencies") .
155. See, e.g., Ambus v. Utah State Bd. of Educ., 858 P .2d 1:172, 1 ~n5 (Uta h 199~1)
(discussing a terminated teacher's claim that the state's morality statute was
u ncon stitutionally vague as applied to his terminati on for a n a rres t tor di st ributing
marijuana, which was eventuall y expunged).
156. See Thompson v. Sw. Sch. Dist., 48:3 F. Supp. 1170, 1178 (W.D. Mo. 1980);
A mbus, 858 P. 2d a t 1375.
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vague, 157 other courts have held statutory morals clauses to be
unconstitutionally vague, as they fail to give notice as to the
immoral conduct that is prohibited under the statutes. 158 One
such case is Burton v. Cascade School District Union High
School No . 5, where a teacher was dismissed from her teaching
position at a public high school on grounds that she was a
homosexual, which allegedly constituted immoral conduct
under Oregon's statute governing grounds for dismissals of
teachers. 159 The Burton court found that the statute vested in
the school board the power to dismiss teachers for immorality,
but failed to define immorality. 16°
As the court explained:
Immorality means different things to different people and its
definition depends on the idiosyncrasies of the individual
school board members. It may be applied so broadly that
every teacher in the state could be disciplined. The potential
for arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement is inherent in
such a statute. 16 1

The court determined that the statute was so broad as to
make those "charged with its enforcement the arbiters of
morality for the entire community." 162 In conclusion, the court
held that the statute was unconstitutionally vague because it
failed to give fair warning of what conduct was prohibited, and
because it permitted "erratic and prejudiced exercises of
authority." 163
Rather than finding entire statutory morals clauses
unconstitutionally vague, like the Burton court, other courts
have found that such statutes do not violate procedural due

157. See, e.g. , Sullivan v. Meade Cou nty lndep. Sch . Dist. No. 101, 387 F. Supp.
1237, 1247 (D.S .D. 1975) (finding that a statute pursuant to which a teacher was
dismissed for immorality as a r esult of living with her boyfriend was not so vague as to
violate the due process clause); see also San Filippo , 961 F.2d at 1127 (stating that
"provisions pe rmitting discharge for immoral conduct, just cause or conduct
unbecoming a teacher ... have been upheld against void for vagueness attacks in cases
involving the discharge of teachers, professors and other public employees").
158. See Burton v. Cascade Sch. Dist. Union High Sch. No. 5, 353 F. Supp. 254,
254-55 (D . Or. 1973) (construing Oregon's statute t hat provided in pertinent part that
"[d]uring the period of the contract ... the district school board shall dismiss t eachers
only for . .. immorality").
159. ld.
160. ld. at 255.
Hil. ld .
162. Id.
16:3. Id.
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process, through a narrow construction of said statutes. 164
Specifically, these courts have found a legislative intent "to
allow dismissal only in instances where immoral conduct
adversely affected a teacher's performance." 165 In these cases,
claims of vagueness are "resolved by a more precise judicial
construction and application of the statute in conformity with
legislative objectives." 166
Although there has been some variance with respect to
courts' decisions on procedural due process claims regarding
the discipline or termination of secondary and postsecondary
educators, several unifying principles are clear. First, in order
for an educator to be entitled to procedural due process, that
educator must have "a legitimate claim of entitlement" to a
benefit-in other words, the educator must have a legitimate
property or liberty interest at stake. 167 Tenure has been held to
constitute a valid property interest to necessitate the
requirements of constitutional procedural due process. 168
However, tenure is not the only constitutional property interest
for educators. 169 Once a sufficient constitutional interest has
been established, procedural due process requires that the
educator be given adequate notice and an opportunity to be
heard. 17 Finally, due process requires that the morals clause
at Issue, whether statutory or contractual, not be
unconstitutionally vague. 171 As such, state legislatures,
governmental attorneys, and educational agencies should be
mindful of all of these requirements in drafting statutes,
contracts, or new school policies if such entities wish to avoid a
potential finding of a Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment
violation.

°

2. Substantive due process
Educational morals clauses have also been challenged on

164. See, e.g., Thompson, 483 F. Supp. at1178; Weissman v. Bd. of Educ. of
Jefferson City. Sch. Dist., 547 P.2d 1267 (Colo. 1976).
165. Thompson, 483 F. Supp. at 1178.
166. Morrison, 461 P.2d at 390.
167. Roth, 408 U.S. at 577.
168. San Filippo, 961 F.2d at 1134.
169. See, e.g., Stovall, 602 So. 2d at 407 (considering expectancy of employment as
a property interest).
170. See, e.g., Armstrong, 380 U.S. at 552.
171. See Burton, 353 F. Supp. at 254-55.
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the grounds that they violate substantive due process. 172 This
component of due process requires that the termination of a
secondary or postsecondary educator's property interest not be
"arbitrary, capncwus, or without a rational basis." 173
Additionally, dismissal or discipline of an educator will be
deemed to violate substantive due process if such action "is
trivial, or is unrelated to the educational process or to working
relationships with the education institution, or is wholly
unsupported by a basis or fact." 174
To illustrate, in Fisher v. Snyder, a school board's refusal to
renew a nontenured high school teacher's contract was held to
violate her substantive due process rights because such refusal
was arbitrary and capricious in nature. 175 The teacher was a
middle-aged divorcee who lived by herself in a one-bedroom
apartment. 176 On "several occasions, young ladies, married
couples, and young men who were friends of her son" stayed
overnight at the teacher's apartment. 177 Subsequently, the
school board dismissed the teacher for unbecoming conduct
outside the classroom. 178 The school board justified the
dismissal with a claim that the teacher's actions of allowing
overnight guests in her home could potentially lead to sexual
misconduct. 179 However, the board did not accuse the teacher of
immoral conduct, and there was no proof of improper
conduct. 180 As such, the "district court held the dismissal
impermissible as arbitrary and capricious in violation of [the
teacher's] right to substantive due process," and the district
court's decision was upheld on substantive due process grounds
by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. 181
The courts will, however, be less inclined to find that the
enforcement of a morals clause violates the substantive due
process rights of a secondary or postsecondary educator if no
172. See, e.g., Hainline , 824 P.2d at 959.
173. Tonkovich v. Kan. Bd. of Regents , 159 F.3d 504, 528 (lOth Cir. Kan. 1998).
Moreover, while "a school board may legitimately inquire into the character and
integrity of its teachers," the decisions made in such an inquiry cannot be arbitrary or
capricious. Fisher v. Snyder, 476 F.2d 375, 377 (8th Cir. 1973).
174. Fisher, 476 F.2d at 377.
175. Id. at 376.
176. Id.
177. Fisher, 476 F.2d at 376.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 377.
180. ld.
181. Id. at 376.
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constitutionally protected right is involved, as was the case in
Hainline v. Bond. 182 The teacher in Hainline claimed,
somewhat enigmatically, that the school board's actions of
suspending his teacher's license, pursuant to a statutory
morality clause, after he was arrested for burglary and theft,
deprived him of substantive due process. 183 The Hainline court,
in finding that no substantive due process violation existed,
noted that there was no argument that the burglary and theft
involved some constitutionally protected right of conduct like
free speech or free association. 184
As such, these two sample cases demonstrate that
termination based on "immoral conduct" can form the basis for
a successful substantive due process claim if (1) a
constitutionally protected right is at issue in the case, and (2)
the school acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner. Future
court cases, based on statutory and contractual morals clauses,
will no doubt define the contours of the substantive due process
standard.

B. Privacy Rights
A recurring controversy involving morals clauses for
teachers is whether a particular statutory or contractual
morality provision violates the teacher's fundamental right of
privacy. The constitutional right of privacy, stemming from the
Fourteenth Amendment, refers to "a right of personal privacy,
or a guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy." 185 Rights of
personal privacy include "the interest in independence in
making certain kinds of important decisions." 186 Specifically,
the fundamental, constitutional right of privacy protects
individuals against government interference in personal
decisions in marriage, 187 procreation, 188 contraception, 189 child
rearing and education. 190
182. 824 P.2d at 959.
183. Id. at 963.
184. Id. at 964.
185. Roe v. Wade. 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) ("The Court has recognized that a right
of personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy, does exist under
the Constitution.").
186. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977).
187. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
188. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541-42 (1942).
189. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
190. Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925).
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Morals clauses for teachers have been held to violate some
of these constitutionally protected areas, like the right to
obtain a divorce 191 and the right to procreate. 192 For example,
in Ponton v. Newport News Schools, the plaintiff teacher
claimed that the school violated her constitutional right to
privacy "by forcing her to take a leave of absence from her
teaching position because she was single and pregnant." 193 This
leave of absence was pursuant to a personnel "policy" regarding
unwed, pregnant teachers, in which these teachers could "(1)
get married, (2) take a leave of absence, or (3) resign." 194 The
Court held that the "plaintiffs constitutional right of privacy
was violated when she was forced to take the leave." 195
Although there have been cases in which an educator's
right to privacy has been violated pursuant to the exercise of
educational morals clauses, it is important to keep in mind that
the right of privacy, like other constitutional rights, is not
absolute. 196 State regulations that engage areas addressed by
the constitutional right to privacy may be permissible if such
regulation is justified by a compelling state interest. 197
Further, as with substantive due process claims, courts are less
inclined to find that morality as a condition of employment
violates a teacher's privacy rights if no fundamental right is
involved. 198 Clearly, the claims of infringement of secondary
and postsecondary educators' constitutional, fundamental
rights to privacy will continue to be litigated under the
statutory and morals clause context. How these rights will be
defined, expanded, or restricted in both the public and private
191. In Littlejohn v. Rose, 768 F.2d 765 (6th Cir. 1985), a nontenured teacher
brought an action for r einstatement of her job after she was terminated based on her
decision to seek a divorce. The Court held th at a material question existed a s to
wheth e r t he refu sal to rehire th e teacher was based on her constitutionally protected
decision to seek a divorce and r eversed the directed verdict of the trial court .
192. Ponton v. Newport News Sch. , 632 F . Supp. 1056 (E.D. Va . 1986).
193. !d. at 1058.
194. ld. at 1059.
195. I d . at 1063.
196. See Ca rey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 686 (1977).
197. See id.
198. See Lile, 701 S.W.2d a t 506. ln Lile, a tenured teach er was te rminated for
immor a l conduct after a sexu al abuse co mplaint wa s fil ed against him. The teacher
claimed that hi s constitutional ri ght to privacy was violated as th e alleged conduct took
place wi thin hi s home, where he had a legitimate expect a tion of privacy . The court
rejected thi s claim and found no violation of the teacher's constitutional rig ht to
privacy as th e conduct for which the t eacher sought protection did not involve a
funda ment al right.
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school arenas will be of key interest to all involved in
education.

C. Freedom of Speech
The constitutionally protected right to free speech may be
regulated in "carefully restricted circumstances." 199 However,
this does not preclude the potential of freedom of speech issues
arising when there is a requirement that teachers comply with
moral clauses for continued employment. Indeed, "First
Amendment rights, applied in light of the special
characteristics of the school environment, are available to
teachers and students." 200
The specific issue of whether enforcement of a morals
clause violates a teacher's First Amendment free speech rights
was addressed by the Supreme Court in Pickering v. Board of
Education.201 In Pickering, the Board of Education of an Illinois
school district dismissed a high school teacher for writing and
publishing in a local newspaper a letter regarding "a recently
proposed tax increase that was critical of the way in which the
Board and the district superintendent of schools had handled
past proposals to raise new revenue for the schools ." 202 The
dismissal resulted from a post-hearing Board determination
that the letter was "detrimental to the efficient operation and
administration of the schools." 203 The dismissed teacher
brought suit, claiming that his First Amendment rights had
been violated. 204 The Supreme Court agreed, stating that
teachers may not be constitutionally compelled to relinquish
the First Amendment rights they would otherwise enjoy as
non-teacher citizens. 205 Consequently, the Court determined
that the school district's actions violated the teacher's right to
exercise free speech. 206
However, if the court determines that the teacher's

199. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513.
200. Id. at 506.
201. 39 1 U.S. 563 (1968).
202. Id. at 564.
203. !d.
204. Id.
205. l d. at 568.
206. !d. at 574 ("[A]bsent proof of fal se statements knowingly or recklessly m ade ..
. a teacher's exercise of hi s right to spea k on issues of public importance may not
furnish t h e basis for his dism issal from public e mployment.").
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behavior is outside of the protection provided for under the
First Amendment, the free speech claim will not be
successful. 207 The case of Palo Verde Unified School District v.
Hensey demonstrates this point. In Hensey, a permanent junior
college professor was dismissed for immoral conduct, which
included stating to his philosophy class that the district
superintendent spent too much time "licking up the board" and,
in connection with this statement, licking the classroom wall
with his tongue in an up and down manner to show that the
school superintendent would rather curry favor with his
superiors than perform his duties. 208 The court determined
that the teacher's actions were not protected under the First
Amendment as they "passed the limits of bad taste and
vulgarity" and constituted an obscene incident that indicated
both "immorality" and "evident unfitness."209 In examining the
case law regarding the interrelationship between educator
disciplinary action, morality, and First Amendment speech
rights , one can note the demarcation of limits of protection for
educators in this arena, similar to due process and privacy
rights.

D. Freedom of Association
Although a school board may legitimately inquire about the
character and integrity of teach e rs, 210 imposing morals clauses
on teachers as a condition of employment can elicit concerns
about constitutional violations of the right of freedom of
association. Freedom of association has two different
mea nings. 2 11 "Under the personal liberty prong of freedom of
association, 'choices to enter into and maintain certain intimate
human relationships must be secured against undue intrusion
by the State.'" 2 12 The relationships that have been deemed to
carry the highest, constitutional protection are "those that
attend the creation and su stenance of a family-marria ge,
childbirth, the raising and education of children, and

207 .
208.
209.
210.
211.
(Aug. 6,
212.

S ee, e.g., Palo Verd e Unifie d Sch. Dist. v. Hensey, 9 Cal. A pp . 3d 967 (1970) .
Id . at 969, 974.
Id. a t 974- 75 .
Fisher, 476 F.2d at 377 .
Weeks v. City of P la no, No. 88 C 0518, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8914, a t *6
1988) .
l d. (quoting Roberts v. United St ates J aycees, 468 U. S. 609, 617- 18 (1984)).
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cohabitation with one's relatives." 213 Conversely, employeremployee relationships are not entitled to constitutional
protections of freedom of association. 214
Non-marital relationships have been held to be entitled to
an intermediate level of constitutional protection between
those relationships warranting maximum constitutional
protection and those requiring no constitutional protections.2 15
The court in Sullivan v. Meade County Independent School
District was presented with the issue of whether the
constitutional rights of an unmarried teacher were violated
when she was dismissed from employment for cohabitation
with her boyfriend. 216 The court, employing the intermediate
level of scrutiny for this type of association, determined that
the teacher's constitutional rights were not violated because
the teacher's conduct had a relationship to her fitness to
teach. 217
The other prong of associational freedom involves the "right
to associate for the purpose of engaging in those activities
protected by the First Amendment such as speech, assembly,
petition for the redress of grievances, and the exercise of
religion." 2 18 A violation of this prong will exist when a
secondary or postsecondary educator is compelled "to disclose
his every associational tie." 219 An illustration of such a
violation is Shelton v. Tucker, where the court held
unconstitutional an Arkansas statute that required teachers to
disclose any and all organizations with which they had been
affiliated within the past five years. 220

E. Equal Protection
Finally, requiring that teachers satisfy certain moral
standards in order to maintain employment may infringe upon
the teachers' equal protection rights. The guarantee to equal
213. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 619.
214. ld. at 620.
215. See id.; see also Kukla v. Viii. of Antioch, 647 F. Supp. 799, 808 (N.D. Ill.
1986).
216. :187 F. Supp. at 1238.
217. ld. at 1247. Although the Sulli van case involved a n elementary school
teacher, this case could have a potential impact on cases involving secondary a nd
postsecondary educators.
218. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 618.
219. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 4 79, 485-·86 (1960).
220. Id. at 490.
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protection under the law means that "no person or class of
persons shall be denied the same protection of the laws which
is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in like
circumstances in their lives, liberty, and property and in their
pursuit of happiness."22l
A typical scenario involving equal protection challenges for
requiring morals clauses for teachers has involved the
fundamenta l right to procreate. 222 This right to procreate
usually involves teachers that become parents out of wedlock,
as in Avery v. Homewood City Board of Education, where a
school board discharged an unwed teacher after she informed
the board that she was pregnant. 223 However, the enforcement
of morals clauses after a teacher has exercised his or her
fundamental right to procreate is not only limited to unwed
teachers as the case involving Kelly Romenesko illustrates-as
previously discussed in Part IV. 224 No doubt this area of
jurisprudence will be expanded as contractual morals clauses
proliferate as conditions of secondary and postsecondary
education.

VII. CONCLUSION
Morals clauses are regularly enforced upon teachers of
secondary and postsecondary schools through state statutes.
However, these clauses are occasionally created through
contractual provisions where the teacher agrees to comply with
prescribed moral standards. In certain instances, morals
clauses can benefit all of the parties involved in the educational
process such as a situation where it is used to protect students
from environments where teachers misuse their power to
commit criminal or harmful acts against the students. Also,
morals clauses can act as protectors of the reputation of the
221. Purifoy v. State Bd. of Educ. , 106 Cal. Rptr. 201, 206-07 (Cal. Ct. App. 1973).
222. See, e.#., Avery v. Hom ewood City Bd. of Educ., 674 F.2d 337, 342 (5th Cir.
19H2) (holding that the distriet court should have determined whether a school board
had prove n hy a preponderance of the evidence that they would have discharged a
teache r eve n in the ah sence of the impermissible ground for discharge, which was that
she had an out of wedlock pregnancy); Andrews v. Drew Mun. Separate Sch. Dist., 507
F.2d 611 , 61:3- 14 (5th Gir. 1975) (holding that a school district's employ ment rule
against em ploying female parents of illegitimate children without any exceptions
viol ated the Equal Protection clause); Rol and, supra note 6, at Al ; Ventura, supra note
98, at 6.
22:3. Avery, 64 7 F.2d at :3:37.
224. Squires, supra note 10a, at lA.
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teaching profession and as protectors of the financial interests
of schools.
Nevertheless, morals clauses can significantly limit a
teacher's activity including activity conducted in their private
lives. The vexing question of whether a teacher bargained for
an around the clock job as a role model has been posed with
differing responses. Some would argue that the right to delve
into the personal lives of teachers comes concomitantly with
the job itself since they serve as role models to the students. On
the other hand, others would argue that the right to limit a
teacher's behavior should end when the teacher leaves the
school grounds.
No matter which position is taken, courts will not uphold a
morals clause that violates a teacher's constitutional rights,
such as the rights to due process, privacy, freedom of speech,
freedom of association, and equal protection. Given the
constitutional implications that can arise, schools must proceed
cautiously when enforcing morals clauses and moral-based
polices against secondary and postsecondary educators.

